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Abstract
The treatment eﬀect of a Swedish employment subsidy is es-
timated using exact covariate-matching and instrumental variables
methods. Our estimates suggest that the programme had a positive
treatment eﬀect for the participants.
We also show how non-parametric methods can be used to estim-
ate the time proﬁle of treatment eﬀects as well as how to estimate
the eﬀect of entering the programme at diﬀerent points in time in
the unemployment spell.
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2 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?1 Introduction
Evaluations of Swedish active labour market programmes (ALMPs) in the
1990s have generally indicated rather disappointing results for the parti-
cipants. However, a number of studies of Swedish ALMPs also suggest
that programmes close to the regular labour market in the sense that they
resemble ordinary jobs have fared better than other programmes in this
respect.1 Two recent surveys of labour market policies in a number of
countries have reached rather conﬂicting conclusions about the relative
eﬃciency of diﬀerent active labour market programmes. Heckman et al.
(1999, p. 2079) conclude, after surveying a large number of studies of
EuropeanALMPs,thattheycannot“...concludethatanyoneactivela-
bour market policy consistently yields greater employment impact than
any other.” Martin & Grubb (2001, p. 31), on the other hand, conclude
that “In several OECD countries, evaluations have found that these pro-
grammes [hiring subsidies paid to private employers] have a greater impact
than public training programmes or direct job creation measures.” The
latter conclusion is more in line with the ﬁndings in recent Swedish stud-
ies. In this paper we study the treatment eﬀects of employment subsidies,
targeted at the long-term unemployed, used in Sweden from the beginning
of January 1998.
An inherent diﬃculty in programme evaluations is the issue of selec-
tion. In this paper we use two distinct identiﬁcation strategies. First,
because we have rich enough data, we use matching estimators.2 Second,
to check the robustness from the matching estimators, we also identify the
treatment eﬀects using instrumental variable (IV) methods. As an instru-
ment we use the fact that the employment subsidy (ES) programmes are
ﬁnanced in a way that does not impose any burden on the budget of the
public employment service (PES) oﬃces. When the National Labour Mar-
ket Board faced budget cutbacks in 1999, this hit the counties diﬀerently;
in some counties assignment to all programmes was reduced substantially
for budget reasons, whereas other counties were aﬀected much less.3 We
argue that this gave rise to variations in programme participation that
were unrelated to the programme eﬀects and, hence, can be used as an
1See, for example, the survey in Calmfors et al. (2001).
2In addition to a number of personal characteristics of eligibles, we can observe their
unemployment histories since August 1991.
3The events are discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
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identiﬁcation strategies is the “correct” one. Hence, we use both, and to
the extent that the results agree, we feel conﬁdent that they are reliable.
A number of previous studies of Swedish ALMPs have investigated the
eﬀects of recruitment subsidies. Recruitment subsidies were used between
1981 and 1997 and were similar to the employment subsidies we study.
These studies generally indicate good results.4 Carling & Richardson
(2001) compared the eﬀects of eight diﬀerent programmes on the prob-
ability of ﬁnding a job and found that recruitment subsidies (possibly
challenged by self-employment grants) was the best programme in this
respect. Sianesi (2002) compared the eﬀects of participating in six pro-
grammes. Recruitment subsidies was the only programme that gave a
signiﬁcantly higher probability to get and keep a job compared to looking
for a job in open unemployment.
Carling & Richardson (2001) argue that their results probably do not
reﬂect selection by showing that programme placement depended more on
the public employment service (PES) oﬃce that the job seeker had visited
than on her observed characteristics. If diﬀerences between PES oﬃces
were uncorrelated with non-observed characteristics of the job seekers,
there should be no selection problem. Sianesi (2002) also assumed that
she had a suﬃcient amount of information about the job seekers to be
able to observe all factors that aﬀect both programme placement and the
result of programme participation for the analysed individuals.5 Hence,
both Carling & Richardson (2001) and Sianesi (2002) rely on that they
by conditioning on a large number of observable characteristics of the job
seekers or their location can estimate treatment eﬀects without selection
problems.
In this paper we primarily rely on the matching estimator suggested
by Fredriksson & Johansson (2004). This estimator gives estimates not
only of a treatment eﬀect, it gives estimates also of the time proﬁle of a
treatment eﬀect. In addition, we are able to estimate treatment eﬀects
for programme entry at diﬀerent points in time (i.e., after unemployment
4A possible exception is Carling & Gustafson (1999), who found that persons em-
ployed with recruitment subsidies faced twice as high a risk to re-enter unemployment
than persons who had received self-employment grants. Calmfors et al. (2001) surveys
the studies comprehensively. In the present paper we only discuss the most recent
studies.
5See also Sianesi (2001).
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on the optimal timing of policies. We use the matching estimator be-
cause we argue that we, just like Carling & Richardson (2001) and Sianesi
(2002), have rich enough information to make it plausible that we avoid
selection on unobserved characteristics that also inﬂuence the outcome
of the participation. However, unlike previous studies, we also estimate
treatment eﬀects with IV methods as a robustness check.
Our results are qualitatively similar to those in previous studies of sim-
ilar Swedish programmes. Programme participation increased the ﬂows
into jobs compared to non-participation for the participants. This ef-
fect has a clear and intuitively reasonable time proﬁle: during the ﬁrst
seven months after entering the programme the participants were “locked
into” the programme. Thereafter the probability to ﬁnd a job was lar-
ger with than without the employment subsidy. If we sum the eﬀects
over all participants we ﬁnd that the time in unemployment decreased by
about 8 months. This approximately corresponds to an eﬀect of about
8 %. These results do not seem to reﬂect selection on unobservables—
our IV estimates are very similar to the matching estimates. Regarding
the timing of the programme, it seems to have been of minor importance:
qualitatively, the eﬀects for those entering just after programme eligibility
(after 12 months of unemployment) were very similar to the eﬀects for
those entering three years later in the unemployment spell.
2 The employment subsidy programmes
2.1 The programmes
As of January 1, 1998, an individual employment subsidy replaced the
former programmes relief work, recruitment subsidies and trainee replace-
ment schemes.6 The employment subsidy was targeted at the long-term
unemployed, i.e., persons at least 20 years old and registered as unem-
ployed at the PES for at least 12 months.7 The subsidy, 50 % of total
6For a more thorough description of the employment subsidy programmes, see
Lundin (2000, 2001).
7The subsidy could, in exceptional cases, be paid for persons who were not long-
term unemployed, provided that they had participated in other programmes or had
been temporarily employed. An exception was also made for youth under age 25. For
this group 90 days of unemployment was the eligibility criterion.
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In October 1999, the individual employment subsidy was abandoned
and replaced by two programmes: a general employment subsidy and an
extended employment subsidy. The set of rules and regulations for the
general employment subsidy was the same as for the previous individual
employment subsidy. The extended employment subsidy was both much
more generous and more strictly targeted at the long-term unemployed:
the subsidy level was 75 % of total wage costs for 6 months and then 25 %
for another 18 months.9 The eligibility requirement was ﬁxed at being
registered at the PES as unemployed or programme participant for at
least 36 months. This requirement was changed to 24 months in January
2000.10
Another novelty introduced in October 1999 was that the subsidies
were no longer paid out as grants to the ﬁrms. Instead, the employer
received a tax reduction. The most important consequence of this for our
IV estimations is that the subsidies no longer were paid out of the budget
of the local PES oﬃce.
2.2 The programme assignment process
The selection to the ES programme involves at least three sets of agents:
caseworkers, the (eligible) unemployed workers and the ﬁrms. The match-
ing approach presumes that these agents do not possess and use informa-
tion (related to programme outcomes) that is unobserved by us.
A ﬁrst question relates to which of the agents has most inﬂuence over
the programme assignment decision.
In a trivial sense, the employers always have an inﬂuence over the
programme assignment in the sense that they can veto any suggestion
8The subsidy was also capped at SEK 350 (approximately e 35) per day and could
be extended to 12 months in some exceptional cases.
9The maximum daily amount was set at SEK 525 for the ﬁrst 6 months and then
SEK 175 for the following 18 months.
10Since August 2000 there are two other forms of employment subsidies in operation.
There is a special employment subsidy, targeted at persons above age 56, and another
form of the extended employment subsidy targeted at those registered at the PES for
at least 48 months. We will look at neither of these in the present study. However,
in the empirical analysis we will treat persons entering extended and the two special
employment subsidy programmes as censored from the point in time they enter the
programmes.
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unemployed and the employers.
Who is the active party? In a survey to caseworkers at the PES,
Lundin (2000) asked a question about who normally takes the ﬁrst initi-
ative to assignment to general ES. According to these (269) caseworkers,
the two main agents were the PES and the ﬁrms. The former normally
took the ﬁrst initiative according to 55 % of the caseworkers whereas the
ﬁrms were the prime movers according to 33 % of the respondents. Only
6 % of the caseworkers replied that the unemployed worker normally took
the ﬁrst initiative. Similar results were found by Johansson (1999), also
asking caseworkers the same question about another programme (trainee
replacement schemes) involving assigning unemployed workers to ordinary
jobs. The results in Harkman (2002) indicate that unemployed workers
were largely indiﬀerent between diﬀerent programmes.11 The results in
Harkman (2002) also indicate that the will to participate was driven at
least as much by other considerations (such as social reasons and the pos-
sibility to renew UI beneﬁt eligibility) as by expectations of an increased
employability.12 Furthermore, some 20 % of the respondents stated that
they participated in a given programme because they had been recom-
mended by a caseworker to do so.
Altogether, the evidence on the programme assignment process presen-
ted above indicates that we need not worry so much about private informa-
tion among the potential programme participants. Caseworkers and ﬁrms
seem to be more important.
The evidence in Harkman (2002) suggests that caseworkers have fairly
strong views on the appropriateness of diﬀerent programmes.13 However,
the results in Eriksson (1997), where several caseworkers assessed the suit-
ability for labour market training of a number of persons, show that the
(usually unobserved, but in her study observed) heterogeneity of the case-
workers was more important than the unobserved (in her study captured
11The unemployed were asked about their interest to participate in 5 diﬀerent pro-
grammes (not including ES). The pairwise correlations between the diﬀerent pro-
grammes fell between 0.4 and 0.6.
12The share of those who entered a programme because of expectations of an increased
employability was falling with longer pre-programme unemployment duration. This
points to the importance of controlling for previous unemployment experiences among
the unemployed.
13In contrast to what was the case for the unemployed, the pairwise correlations
between the ranking of the diﬀerent programmes were generally low.
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(2001) analysed the relative inﬂuence of the characteristics of the unem-
ployed and the PES oﬃce identity on the allocation of unemployed between
two programmes, conditional on entering one of them. The main result is
that oﬃce identity is far more important than the characteristics of the
unemployed in determining which programme the unemployed will enter.
Hence, even though there is reason to believe that caseworkers observe
more than is in our data, they seem to develop decision rules that may be
correlated within but not between PES oﬃces. Controlling for PES oﬃce
identity (which is observed in our data) then would make the study less
susceptible to selection bias.14
How about the inﬂuence of the ﬁrms? The answers to a survey ques-
tion to ES participants in Lundin (2001) indicate that 22 % of the ES
participants had previous work experience in the ﬁrm where they were
employed with the ES. Of these, 18 percentage points performed the same
tasks in the ﬁrm both with and without the employment subsidy. Further-
more, around 70 %, of these 22 %, had their latest employment spell in the
ﬁrm less than two years prior to the survey. Moreover, Omarsson (2000)
and Jansson (1999) show that almost 50 % of the registered unemployed
who found a job in the mid 1990s were rehired by a previous employer.15
Hence, a substantial fraction of the ES participants were known to the
employers, who potentially may have acted on prior information (unob-
served by us) that may be related to the participants’ future employment
prospects. We believe, however, that we are likely to capture this in the
previous unemployment history of the eligibles.
Finally, evidence in Lundin (2001) suggests that not all ES participants
viewed their subsidised employment as a permanent solution—more than
30 % of them responded that they had applied for at least one job while
on the subsidised job. This may also suggest that selection on unobserved
characteristics is not that serious a problem. In a study of the competition
between employed and unemployed job applicants Eriksson & Lagerstr¨ om
(2004) control for all characteristics of the applicants observed by the em-
ployers and ﬁnd strong evidence that ﬁrms view employment status as an
important signal for productivity. Hence, it is imperative to condition on
past unemployment: not only should one control for unobserved hetero-
14In our matching estimates, we control for the local labour market, not the muni-
cipality; in the IV estimates, we control for municipality.
15This fraction was, however, falling in unemployment duration (Jansson 1999).
8 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?geneity per se, past unemployment seems also to be an (observed) signal
to the employer.
2.3 Programme participation
Figures 1 and 2 show the monthly development of participation in the
employment subsidy schemes between January 1998 and September 2002.
In Figure 1 total participation, both for those eligible for the general ES
and total participation, in all ES schemes is displayed. Total participation
includes all persons who, according to the registers of the National Labour
Market Board, were registered in any of the programmes. The eligible
participants are those who, according to the criteria given in Section 2.1,
were eligible for the general ES programme and, in addition, were above
age 25.16
The development in 1999 in Figure 1 is of special interest for our IV
estimations. First, as the budget cutbacks were imposed in April and
May, programme participation dropped. In fact, the timing was such that
the most aﬀected counties imposed a general “placement stop” (PS) at
diﬀerent points in time between July and September.17 The most rapid
drop in programme participation occurred between June and July. Al-
though there seems to be a seasonal pattern in participation with a drop
between June and July in all the years in our data, the drop in 1999 is
larger than in the other years. Then, although we can see a slight increase
in participation already in September 1999, there is a marked increase in
both series late in 1999, consistent with the idea that the combination of
budget cutbacks and the ﬁnancing of the ES programmes would give the
PES oﬃces an incentive to increase placement in the subsidy programmes.
Looking instead at Figure 2, we see how participation in the individual
ES which was ﬁnanced in the usual way) fades out during the second
16The most important criterion imposed to deﬁne eligibility is an uninterrupted re-
gister spell at the PES lasting for at least 12 months. The diﬀerence between the two
curves, by deﬁnition, reﬂects that a substantial fraction of the participants either were
not eligible according to our strict criteria or were below age 25. The exact procedure
that we used to construct our data set is described in Section 4.
17This aﬀected participation in all programmes, but it is reasonable to assume that
expensive programmes would be more aﬀected than cheap programmes, such as the ES
programmes. It is also clear from our data that the phrase “placement stop” should not
be taken completely at face value and that programme participation started to decrease
already before the “formal” placement stop was imposed.
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Figure 1: Participation in employment subsidy schemes 1998:1–2002:9
(number of persons)
Source: Own computations using information from the H¨ andel data base
half of 1999. But we also see a sharp increase in participation in the
general and (especially) the extended employment subsidies beginning in
October 1999, when they were introduced. We use only information on
participation in individual and ‘general ES in our analysis. However, it is
clear that we must take the emergence of the other employment subsidy
schemes into account in our analysis, as a sub group of those individuals
eligible for the general ES were also eligible for other ES schemes. We do
this by treating them as programme eligibles as long as they do not enter
any of the ES schemes. If they enter any of the other schemes, we censor
them from this point in time. This procedure is justiﬁed if anticipations
of future participation in any of the other ES schemes do not change their
job-seeking behaviour.18
Figure 3 plots the survival functions (from eligibility, i.e., after 12
18See the discussion in Richardson & van den Berg (2001).
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Figure 2: Participation in diﬀerent employment subsidy schemes 1998:1–
2002:9
Source: Own computations using information from the H¨ andel data base
months of open unemployment) for participants and eligible non-partici-
pants. Initially, the non-participants leave unemployment faster than the
participants. This would be consistent with the idea that participation ini-
tially “locks in” the participants. Then, after some initial 20 months, the
fraction of participants remaining without a regular job becomes signiﬁc-
antly lower than the corresponding fraction of non-participants. However,
none of these “eﬀects” should be given a causal interpretation. The “suc-
cess” of the non-participants in the initial periods may, at least partly,
be that non-participants become non-participants precisely because they
ﬁnd jobs.19 The “success” of the participants later on may partly reﬂect
the fact that they, on average, entered the register at an earlier date (see
Table 2), and, hence, have had a longer period of time to ﬁnd a job so
that they to a smaller degree tend to become censored (censoring is in
19See the discussion in Fredriksson & Johansson (2004).
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better job opportunities. We also see that most eligibles have entered the
programme after some 80 months of unemployment and that most enter
the programme relatively early.




























Figure 3: Survival functions from eligibility for participants (ES) and
non-participants (Not ES). Risk is employment. Survival function from
eligibility for participants (To ES). Risk is ES.
3 Identiﬁcation
To estimate programme eﬀects in this dynamic setting, we use two dif-
ferent identiﬁcation strategies. Our main approach is (exact) covariate-
matching. Here the idea is that if we can observe (and account for) all
factors that jointly determine participation and the outcome of particip-
12 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?ation, then in practice we have a randomised experiment where we can
compare the outcome of participants and matched non-participants to es-
timate the treatment eﬀect. The critical assumption is that we actually
observe everything of importance.
Our other approach is to exploit variations in programme participation
caused by the budget cut-backs in April/May 1999 and the change to
funding of the ES schemes through tax reductions in October 1999. This
variation should be unrelated to the programme eﬀects and gives us yet
another way to take care of selection into the ES programme.
The two identiﬁcation strategies are described more thoroughly in sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2.
3.1 Matching
When determining the treatment eﬀect of programme participation, the
fundamental problem can be described as one of missing data. We can
never observe a person as both participant and non-participant in a cer-
tain programme during a certain time period. Hence, we must always
compare participants with non-participants. In controlled experiments
programme treatment is randomised across those in the stock of eligibles
for the programme. In such a setting there is no reason to believe that
there are systematic diﬀerences between participants and non-participants.
An average treatment eﬀect can therefore easily be estimated through a
comparison of the means of the two groups.
In the absence of controlled experiments there are good reasons to be-
lieve that participation is related to characteristics of the individuals that
are also related to the outcome. Matching aims at “creating” an experi-
mental situation by comparing persons who are so similar that participa-
tion actually becomes random. This identifying assumption is not testable,
but obviously the identiﬁcation strategy demands a lot of the data—unless
we have rich information about the individuals, the chances are small that
we actually observe everything of importance both for participation and
the results of participation. However, we have rather rich information
about those eligible for the employment subsidy scheme. In particular,
we observe their unemployment experiences since August 1991.20 This
variable arguably picks up many factors that otherwise would be hard to
20As pointed out on page 8, we also observe the municipality of the unemployed. The
data are described in Section 4.
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In the matching we follow Fredriksson & Johansson (2004) and estim-
ate the diﬀerence in survival rates at duration t from treatment (i.e. when
entering into ES) for an “average” treated individual if in ES instead of
not being in ES. The details of the matching are presented in Fredriksson
& Johansson (2004).
3.2 Instrumental variables identiﬁcation
There is geographical variation and variation over time in the probability
of being assigned to ES. This variation in itself, however, cannot be used
directly as it may be related to other factors (e.g., the business cycle, the
labour market situation). Therefore we compare employment oﬃces in the
same local labour market, where in some ES was stopped and in others
not. We could simply use this placement stop within the same local labour
market as an instrument. We do not do so, because we worry over the
monotonicity condition required for IV identiﬁcation. Instead we use the
introduction of a tax reduction (TR, see below), which should give a bigger
increase in treatment probability in the programme-stop (PS) than in the
non-PS regions. Essentially, we compare the PS with the non-PS regions,
but in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator we exploit not the diﬀerences in
treatment probability between these two regions but rather the increase
in treatment probability after the TR.
Hence, we use regional and time-series variations in programme par-
ticipation induced by responses to changes programme ﬁnancing as an
alternative way to identify the treatment eﬀects of the ES programmes.
Below we describe the events in some detail.
The budget of the National Labour Market Board is laid out annually
in the budget bill. The ﬁscal year coincides with the calendar year. The
government decides on the allocation of funds at the turn of the year. The
National Labour Market Board allocates funds to the regional (county)
labour market authorities, which in turn allocate funds to the local PES
oﬃces.21
During 1999 the budget for the National Labour Market Board was
considered tight by oﬃcials at the Board. On top of this, in April, the gov-
ernment withdrew funds. Changes in the allocation of funds are primar-
ily undertaken as a result of changed needs of the number of programme
21Those funds should cover the expenses of the PES oﬃce for the whole year.
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forecasts (Government Bill 98/99:100 1999, p 40). These cutbacks were
distributed according to the size of county budgets. The consequences,
however, were unevenly distributed depending on how much of the funds
had already been used. In some counties programme placement was cut
substantially, in some counties they were cut heavily (placement stop (PS),
“beslutsstopp”) and some counties, ﬁnally, were only mildly aﬀected.22
We pointed out in Section 2.1 that a feature of the ES programmes was
that, from October 1999, they were given in the form of a tax reduction
and, hence, did not impose any cost on the local PES oﬃces. Our point of
departure, ﬁnding support in the answers to our questionnaire to ﬁnancial
managers at the county labour market authorities, is that this design of the
subsidy schemes would give local PES oﬃces diﬀerent incentives to expand
the subsidy programmes depending on whether or not they were located
in a county that was severely hit by the budget cutbacks. If so, then
the hazard into the subsidy schemes would depend on the location of the
unemployed job seeker: we would, ceteris paribus, expect a more rapid ﬂow
into employment subsidy programmes in counties severely aﬀected by the
budget cutbacks (i.e., in the PS counties). However, it may well have been
the case that the PS counties were severely aﬀected by the budget cutbacks
because of bad conditions in the labour market.23 Such conditions would
also imply a lower job-ﬁnding probability, in which case the events would
seem not to provide us with a good instrument for evaluating the impact
on employment of ES participation.
However, local labour markets, deﬁned by Statistics Sweden based on
commuting patterns, extend over county borders.24 Our questionnaire re-
vealed that, in fact, there were 69 municipalities (with local PES oﬃces)
located in diﬀerent counties, hit diﬀerently by the budget cutbacks, but
within the same local labour market (totally 8 diﬀerent local labour mar-
kets).25 Hence, in these 8 local labour markets the new mode of ﬁnancing
22We have distributed a questionnaire to the ﬁnancial managers of the regional labour
market authorities to establish how they reacted to the cutbacks. See also the discussion
in Section 2.3.
23A bad state in the labour market could have induced large expenditures on labour
market programmes early in 1999, which in turn created a need for a more restrictive
programme placement policy after the budget cutbacks.
24In principle, local labour markets are deﬁned so as to minimise commuting over the
market borders.
25The municipalities are displayed on a map in Appendix C.
IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane? 15the ES programme is a potentially good instrument in the sense that it
can be expected to have aﬀected programme participation without at the
same time aﬀecting the outcome conditional on whether a municipality
was or was not in a PS county.
The events in 1999 would seem to suggest a second natural way to
identify treatment eﬀects: we could use the budget cutbacks in April as
an instrument for participation in ES. Notice, however, that this does
not necessarily work as an instrument because the expected eﬀect of the
cutbacks on ES participation is ambiguous. On the one hand, the cut-
backs implied generally lower programme volumes. On the other hand,
we would expect the most expensive programmes to be the ones most af-
fected. Hence, it is likely that there would have been a substitution from
expensive programmes (i.e., training) to cheaper programmes, such as ES.
The net eﬀect is ` ap r i o r iambiguous. More importantly for the IV strategy
to work: we cannot be sure that the sign of the eﬀect is the same in all 69
municipalities.
We use the placement stop (PS) and tax reduction (TR) to estimate
the treatment eﬀect of the employment subsidy (ES) with three diﬀerent
IV estimators. The logic is straight forward: if the programme actually
speeded up the ﬂow to employment and if the tax reduction (exogen-
ously) pushed more persons into the programme in the PS municipalities
(as compared to municipalities in the same local labour markets), then
the ﬂow into employment must have increased after October 1999. Some
technicalities of the estimations are described in Appendix B.
3.2.1 The diﬀerence in diﬀerence idea
We use three diﬀerent IV estimators, which basically diﬀer in the func-
tional form assumptions made. For all three estimators the principle of
identiﬁcation is the following: Let Yi(0) and Yi(1) be potential employ-
ment if joining the ES program (Di = 1) and not (Di = 0). We observe
Yi(0) for the non participants and Yi(1) for the participants. The observed
employment then equals
Yi = Yi(0) + Di(Yi(1) − Yi(0))
= β0 + Diβi + εi,
16 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?where εi = Yi(0)−β0. Di is determined by the increased placement in ES
in the PS municipalities due to the tax reduction, Zi, as
Di = Di(0) + Zi(Di(1) − Di(0)) + ηi
= Di(0) + Ziαi,
where Di(0) is treatment taken if Zi = 0 and Di(1) is the treatment taken
when Zi =1 .
Under the assumptions
1. Potential outcomes and treatments are independent of Zi, i.e.
Yi(0),Y i(1),D i(0),D i(1) ⊥ ⊥ Zi, 26
2. Monotonicity (αi > 0, i.e., there exist no deﬁers)
the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE) is deﬁned as
δ =
E(Yi|Zi =1 )− E(Yi|Zi =0 )
E(Di|Zi =1 )− EDi|Zi =0 )
Here “|” denotes “conditional on”. LATE is the treatment eﬀect of those
aﬀected (the compliers) by the instrument, Zi. If the individuals do not
select into ES on relative advantages, δ is the treatment eﬀect for a ran-
domly drawn unemployed.
The above presentation of a treatment eﬀect estimand is quite stand-
ard, see Angrist & Krueger (1999). For our application, however, we need
to consider both the timing of treatment and the timing of employment.
In addition, we also need to condition on the tax reduction (TR) and




i be the (ﬁx time) eligibility duration to the placement stop and to





i), where wi =1
if an individual is aﬀected by the tax reduction and wi = 0 otherwise.
Let the potential future outcomes if not treated and treated at eli-
gibility duration τi be Y (τi,0) and Y (τi,1), respectively, and denote the
potential future treatments D(τi,0) and D(τi,1). If we condition on the
placement stop, tax reduction and duration, τi, we assume Z(τi)t ob ea
valid instrument. Thus,
(Y (τi,0),Y(τi,1),D(τi,0),D(τi,1)) ⊥ ⊥ Z(τi)|(PS(τ
p
i),TR(τi),τi)( 1 )
26The symbol “⊥ ⊥” denotes “independent of” as deﬁned in Dawid (1979).
IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane? 17Let Di and Yi be the, post τi, observed assignment and outcome, respect-








are known. Then, given the assumption in (1) it is possible to approximate





where g (·)a n dh (·) are ﬁrst order derivatives of the functions above.
If g(·)a n dh(·) are identity function this is the “standard” Wald es-
timator (see, e.g., Angrist & Krueger (1999)). This Wald estimator is
equivalent to the two stage least squares estimator (2SLS).27
For the 2SLS estimator the assignment to the programme is speciﬁed
as
Di = τi + α1Z(τi)+α2TR(τi)+α3PS(τ
p
i)+ηi (5)
and the outcome is speciﬁed as
Yi = τi + δ1Di + β2TR(τi)+β3PS(τ
p
i)+εi. (6)
Here ηi is a regression error, while εi is not. The 2SLS estimator uses
predictions from the ﬁrst step as an instrument for Di in the estimation
of the outcome model in the second step.
The three diﬀerent IV estimators that we use diﬀer regarding the as-
sumptions made to identify treatment eﬀects. The ﬁrst estimator is non-
parametric, the second estimator requires additive separability and con-
stant (over unemployment durations) treatment eﬀects and the third in
addition requires a functional form assumption (we estimate proportion
hazard regression models to employment subsidy and to job). The ad-
vantage with putting on more structure is, of course, increased eﬃciency.
The disadvantage is an increased bias. All three IV estimators are based
on ratios of estimates. However, only the second one can bee seen as a
27If individuals select into ES based on relative advantages the treatment eﬀect es-
timates will be biased. For the linear approximations, i.e., if g(·)a n dh(·)a r ei d e n t i t y
functions, the LATE is estimated.
18 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?standard Wald estimator, whereas the other two estimators can be seen
as variants thereof.
In the ﬁrst estimation we suggest a Wald estimator in a duration frame-
work. This enables us to estimate treatment eﬀects for the up to t duration
treated unemployed. The second estimator is a traditional 2SLS estimator
where ﬁrst equation (5) is estimated. In a second step we then estimate
(6) using the ﬁrst step predictions as an instrument. To implement this
estimator we need to make an assumption about the time it takes for the
treatment to have an eﬀect. For this reason we estimate the model under
diﬀerent lengths of the evaluation period.
In the third approach proportional hazard models of equations (2)
and (3) is speciﬁed (i.e. E(D) is exchanged for hazard to ES and E(Y )i s
exchanged for the hazard to employment).28 The eﬀect of the ES is then
estimated as the ratio between separate maximum likelihood estimates:
 ∆PH =  β1/ α1 (7)
The interpretation of ∆PH is the percentage eﬀect on the monthly unem-
ployment rate from increasing the number in ES by one percent. In ad-
dition to the functional form assumption, we make an assumption about
the timing of the eﬀect: the eﬀect is immediate after entering ES and the
same (on the hazard) throughout unemployment spell.
4 The data
Our data derive from the administrative database H¨ andel from the Na-
tional Labour Market Board. The database contains information on all
registered unemployed persons in Sweden since August 1991. The data-
base includes information on, e.g., age, highest level of education and sex,
as well as the individuals’ registration date, job training activities and
starting and ending dates of participation in labour market programmes.
It also contains information on what kind of programme the unemployed
person participates in.29 The data used in this study extend to October
2002.
28The estimated equations are given in equations (B4) and (B5) in Appendix B2.
29More precisely: each job seeker is registered under some “job-seeker category” de-
ﬁning his or her labour market status. For each individual, every change in job-seeker
category is registered.
IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane? 19For each individual registered at the PES we observe an event history
including the number of spells and days of unemployment. All persons
who have left the employment oﬃces register before the introduction of
the ES programme are dropped from the data. To eliminate uncertainty of
at what point in time the individuals ﬁrst were registered as unemployed
at the unemployment oﬃce, we exclude all of those for which the ﬁrst spell
of unemployment occurred before January 1, 1992.
One of the main criteria to become eligible for the programme is to
be registered as unemployed at the employment oﬃce for a continuous
period of at least 365 days (see Section 2.1). Thus, to become eligible for
the programme, the unemployed must have a spell of unemployment of at
least 365 days extending to at least the day when the programme started.
Individuals who do not fulﬁl this criterion are dropped from the data we
analysed in this study.
Until December 31, 2000, individuals under 25 years of age had the
possibility to start the ES programme with a registered spell of only 90
days. Due to this exception, all unemployed persons under 25 years of
age on January 1, 1998 (the starting date of the programme) or later
are excluded from the data set. We have also excluded those who at
the month they registered at the PES were at least 63 years old (15,160
persons).30 We have also excluded all individuals who had register spells
with negative duration before the last spell (324 spells). Finally, because
we have discretised time, we have discarded 63 spells that began as ES
spells but ended in employment in at most 29 days.
A spell of unemployment is deﬁned as an uninterrupted period of time
when an unemployed person is registered at the employment oﬃce. The
spell is ended if the unemployed person gets a job for a period of at least
30 days, or if he or she, for any reason, leaves the employment oﬃces’
register for a period of at least 30 days.
It is possible to have more than one spell of unemployment of at least
365 days without interruption during the time the ES programme has been
going on. Thus, an individual can be eligible for the programme more than
once. The unit of observation is chosen to be every time a person becomes
eligible for the ES programme. In the analysis we use information on
each individual’s total number of spells and days in unemployment before
becoming eligible for the ES. For those who are eligible more than once
30This is done because the individuals, to become eligible, in principle must be re-
gistered for one year. Furthermore, the programme duration is also at least six months.
20 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?the total number of days and spells is aggregated each time they become
eligible. Thus, the data include only persons who have been eligible for
the ES programme on at least one occasion.
The individuals in the data are separated into two diﬀerent groups:
those who start the ES programme after 365 days or longer, and those
who do not start the programme. Each time a person becomes eligible,
the total number of months until he or she either leaves the PES oﬃce or
becomes right censored is calculated. The point in time for right censoring
is 1 October 2002 (which is where our data set ends) or the point in time
where a person leaves the register for other destinations than work. For
those who enter the ES programme, the duration to ES is calculated as
well.
The outcome of interest is if, and at what point in time, the individual
gets a job. In this study the outcome “job” is deﬁned as either to leave
the employment oﬃces’ register for employment31 or being temporary em-
ployed32 for a minimum period of 30 days. A non-trivial number of persons
leave the register for unknown reasons (which may well include work, see
Bring & Carling, 2000, or Sahin, 2003). To the extent that there are
systematic diﬀerences between participants and non-participants in the
fraction of those who leave the register for unknown reason that actually
leave it for work, we would get biased estimates of the treatment eﬀect
by using our measure of “job”.33 To check this, we used a matched re-
gister with information both on “Avaktualiseringsorsak”34 according to
the H¨ andel data base and on monthly employment status according to
ﬁrms’ reports to the tax authorities (derived from a data base from Stat-
istics Sweden). In this matched data base we can follow individuals for
the years 1998 through 2000. In fact, people on ES leaving the PES for
unknown reasons to a larger extent than eligible non-participants went to
a job during the period according to our data. 35 If anything, then, using
our measure of “job” would tend to give the estimated treatment eﬀect of
ES a downward bias.
The total number of persons aged 25–63 who were eligible for ES in
31Leaving the register if the variable “Avaktualiseringsorsak” is equal to 1, 2 or 3.
32The individual is considered to have a job if he or she is registered under the job-
seekers category “Skat 31” for a period of at least 30 days.
33This problem has been pointed out by Sianesi (2001, 2002).
34When a person leaves the register, each exit has a code, avaktualiseringsorsak.
35See Appendix A for details.
IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane? 21the whole country and the period between January 1998 and October 2002
was 631,358. This population of eligibles is described in Table 1.3 . 2 %
of the eligible spells ended up entering individual or general ES schemes
(Skat 45 or Skat 47). The most salient feature of the eligible persons is that
they on average had a long lasting relationship with the PES: in addition
to the days spent in the register in order to become eligible, the average
number of days in the register was almost 500 and the average number of
earlier spells in the register was almost 1.5. Approximately 40 % of the
spells ended in regular employment.
4.1 The data used for the matching estimates
Matching is based on 631,358 persons, 19,951 of which enter ES. In ad-
dition to the eligibility duration, we match on all covariates in Table 2 as
well as on the local labour market in which the individual is registered a a
job seeker. Some variables have been categorised (age and the number of
previous programmes in four categories, the number of previous register
days in ﬁve categories).36
In Table 2 we compare the participants and non-participants in the
eligible population. A signiﬁcantly higher fraction (64 % as compared
to 39 %) of the ES participants ended up in employment. As we have
already pointed out, this does not necessarily indicate a positive treatment
eﬀect; it more likely reﬂects the fact that the programme participants on
average registered earlier (in calender time; T0 is smaller) at the PES
and, hence, on average had spent a longer time looking for a job. Males
and non-Nordic immigrants were over represented and disabled were under
represented among the participants. The education level was higher among
the participants, the participants were younger and had spent less time
at the PES prior to the last period of unemployment. Given reasonable
priors (ours) about how these characteristics should inﬂuence the exit
to employment, most likely the participants should be expected to leave
unemployment more rapidly than the non-participants.
In the matching estimation, 12,300 persons in the ES programme are
removed due to lack of common support (no matching individual found in
control group). Hence, the matching is based on 7,651 treated individuals.
Descriptive statistics for the matched participants are displayed in column
ﬁve (“Matched mean”) of Table 2.
36The categories are deﬁned in Table 1.
22 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all eligibles
Variable Description Mean Std. dev. Min Max
ES =1 if in ES program 0.03 0.17 0 1
Duration Current spell duration (months) 23.7 23.2 1 118
Employed =1 if regularly employed 0.40 0.49 0 1
Male =1 if male 0.41 0.49 0 1
NonNordic =1 if non-Nordic citizen 0.14 0.35 0 1
NoUI =1 if no unemployment insurance 0.18 0.38 0 1
Disabled =1 if disabled 0.10 0.30 0 1
Gymnasium =1 if upper secondary degree 0.35 0.48 0 1
University =1 if university degree 0.12 0.33 0 1
Age1 =1 if age ≤ 30 0.22 0.42 0 1
Age2 =1 if 30 < age ≤ 40 0.31 0.46 0 1
Age3 =1 if 40 < age ≤ 50 0.24 0.43 0 1
TD1
=1 if days in register during
previous spell (TD) = 0
0.38 0.48 0 1
TD2 =1 if 0 < TD ≤ 100 0.05 0.21 0 1
TD3 =1 if 100 < TD ≤ 500 0.20 0.40 0 1
TD4 =1 if 500 < TD ≤ 1000 0.18 0.38 0 1
TP1
=1 if previous number of program-
mes (TP) = 0
0.39 0.49 0 1
TP2 =1 if 0 < TP ≤ 5 0.39 0.49 0 1
TP3 =1 if 5 < TP ≤ 15 0.21 0.41 0 1
T0
Month turning eligible, January
1998=1 October 2002=118
69.8 27.6 1 118
Inspecting column ﬁve in Table 2 we see that the matched sample
on the whole (as expected) resembles the non-participants more than
the whole group of participants. This means that the participants in
the matched sample (compared to all participants) had somewhat fewer
earlier days in unemployment or labour market programmes (see TD1–
TD4), smaller fractions of males, non-Nordic immigrants, persons without
unemployment insurance and disabled. They also are somewhat older and
less educated. On balance, given our priors, they may be a positively se-
lected group in terms of labour market prospects, but the diﬀerences are
not staggering.
4.2 The data used for the IV estimates
The data set used in the IV estimations is limited to the persons who were
eligible for ES under the period of placement stop (May 1999–December
IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane? 23Table 2: Mean characteristics of participants (ES), non-participants (No
ES), and exactly matched sample (Matched)
ES No ES ES-No ES Matched
Variable Mean Mean t-value Mean
Duration 34.38 23.37 62.90 –
Employed 0.64 0.39 71.54 –
Covariates
Male 0.61 0.41 56.38 0.56
NonNordic 0.21 0.14 25.41 0.14
NoUI 0.16 0.18 -5.43 0.11
Disabled 0.06 0.10 -20.41 0.02
Gymnasium 0.43 0.35 24.08 0.42
University 0.12 0.12 -3.43 0.09
Age1 0.26 0.22 11.34 0.24
Age2 0.32 0.31 3.39 0.30
Age3 0.27 0.24 7.04 0.25
TD1 0.41 0.38 9.44 0.51
TD2 0.05 0.05 4.28 0.02
TD3 0.22 0.20 8.37 0.19
TD4 0.18 0.18 1.22 0.15
TP1 0.41 0.38 7.15 0.51
TP2 0.42 0.39 7.82 0.35
TP3 0.17 0.22 -18.62 0.14
T0 58.33 70.22 -65.75 60.18
1999) in the 8 local labour markets with municipalities that were and were
not aﬀected by the placement stop (PS). This gives us 80,905 individuals
living in 69 municipalities in the IV estimations.
Some characteristics of these data are presented in Table 3. Compared
to the group of all eligibles in Table 1, the persons in the sample used in the
IV analysis look fairly similar, although they had somewhat fewer previous
days in the register, fewer previous spells in programmes, a smaller fraction
ﬁnding employment, a larger fraction of ES participants, a larger fraction
of non-Nordic immigrants, a higher fraction of males, a higher fraction with
no UI and larger shares with at least high school education. Thus, the IV
sample seems to be a positive selection of the unemployed in comparison
to the total sample of eligibles.
Table 4 compares participants in ES schemes with non-participants
and persons in PS municipalities with persons in non-PS municipalities.
A few points are worth mentioning. First, males are strongly over-
24 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the data set used
in the IV estimations1
Variable Mean Std dev Min Max
ES 0.04 0.19 0 1
Duration 33.52 26.25 1 118
Employed 0.44 0.50 0 1
Male 0.44 0.50 0 1
NonNordic 0.18 0.38 0 1
NoUI 0.23 0.42 0 1
Disabled 0.10 0.31 0 1
Gymnasium 0.37 0.48 0 1
University 0.18 0.39 0 1
Age1 0.22 0.41 0 1
Age2 0.30 0.46 0 1
Age3 0.24 0.43 0 1
TD1 0.42 0.49 0 1
TD2 0.05 0.22 0 1
TD3 0.20 0.40 0 1
TD4 0.18 0.39 0 1
TP1 0.42 0.49 0 1
TP2 0.41 0.49 0 1
TP3 0.17 0.38 0 1
T0 59.87 21.20 1 84
1 For descriptions of the variables, see Table 1
represented among participants. Second, the fraction of disabled is much
lower and the fraction of non-nordic immigrants is substantially higher
among the participants. Third, the number of previous days and previous
spells in the register is slightly lower for the participants. Finally, the
participants on average entered the register at an earlier date than the non-
participants, which means that the proportion of censored observations
tends to be higher among the non-participants. Thus, also for this sample
the participants seems to have better job opportunities also absent the
ES.
Comparing instead across PS and non-PS municipalities, a number
of diﬀerences are worth noticing: ﬁrst, persons in PS municipalities on
average had shorter durations of open unemployment and entered the re-
IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane? 25gister later but also had a larger number of days in previous register spells.
Second, males, non-nordic immigrants, and persons without UI are over-
represented in the PS municipalities. However, as we apply a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence estimator, these diﬀerences should not be problematic.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for participants and non-participants and for
eligibles in PS and non-PS municipalities1
Not ES ES Not PS PS
n 77,941 2,964 9,749 71,156
Variable Mean Mean t-value Mean Mean t-value
ES 0 1 na 0.04 0.04 4.02
Duration 33.28 40.06 -14.59 38.40 32.86 19.06
Employed 0.43 0.64 -23.54 0.41 0.44 -6.47
Male 0.44 0.59 -16.20 0.37 0.45 -16.57
NonNordic 0.18 0.25 -9.03 0.09 0.19 -29.77
NoUI 0.23 0.19 5.48 0.16 0.24 -17.68
Disabled 0.11 0.06 9.30 0.11 0.10 2.44
Gymnasium 0.37 0.40 -3.85 0.36 0.37 -1.95
University 0.18 0.18 0.87 0.10 0.19 -26.93
Age1 0.22 0.21 1.34 0.18 0.22 -9.78
Age2 0.30 0.31 -0.91 0.27 0.31 -8.64
Age3 0.24 0.28 -4.28 0.26 0.24 4.34
TD1 0.42 0.43 -1.63 0.46 0.41 10.19
TD2 0.05 0.05 -1.41 0.05 0.05 -0.34
TD3 0.20 0.21 -0.60 0.19 0.21 -4.37
TD4 0.18 0.17 1.10 0.16 0.18 -5.14
TP1 0.42 0.43 -1.02 0.47 0.41 10.51
TP2 0.40 0.43 -3.18 0.38 0.41 -4.70
TP3 0.17 0.14 5.99 0.14 0.18 -8.12
T0 60.06 54.80 13.39 58.06 60.12 -8.81
1 For descriptions of the variables, see Table 1
For our instruments to be valid, it is required that the municipalities
in the local labour markets that we analyse in the IV estimations have a
similar labour market development within each local labour market. We
also require that the placement stop actually aﬀects the rate of programme
placement diﬀerently in the PS and non-PS municipalities. These features
are explored in Figure 4, where we plot the number of openly unemployed,
26 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?the number of ES participants, the number of participants in the exten-
ded ES and the total number of programme participants among the per-
sons who are eligible for the ES between July 1998 and June 2000 in the
eight local labour markets we analyse in the IV estimations, distinguishing
between municipalities with and without PS.
In the two upper panels of Figure 4 we see that open unemployment
and participation in the extended ES develop extremely similarly in the
two groups of municipalities. Although not conclusive, this evidence sup-
ports instrument validity.
The two bottom panels show ES participation and total participation
in all ALMPs for the eligible sample. Looking ﬁrst at total programme
participation (right panel), there was a pronounced drop in both PS and
non-PS municipalities, beginning at about the time when the budget cut-
backs were enforced (April or May).37 The drop was somewhat larger in
the PS municipalities, and the programme volume in the PS municipal-
ities did not catch up during the period depicted in the ﬁgure. For ES
participation (left panel), the picture was a diﬀerent one. In the PS muni-
cipalities, ES participation decreased when the PS was enforced, while the
opposite was true for the non-PS municipalities. Then, in October 1999,
ES participation increased in the PS municipalities whereas it decreased
between October and December 1999 in the non-PS municipalities.
All in all, the developments shown in Figure 4 indicate that the budget
cutbacks and the change in the mode of ﬁnance of the ES programme actu-
ally gives rise to some independent variation in ES participation between
municipalities that we can use to identify a treatment eﬀect.
5 Results
5.1 The matching estimator
We begin by considering the matching estimates of the treatment eﬀect of
the employment subsidy programme. In Figure 5 we show estimated sur-
vival functions,  S1(t)a n d S0(t) for the individuals who entered ES and not
entering ES, respectively. For both samples (not matched and matched)
we condition on the eligibility duration and use the Kaplan-Meier estim-
ator (see, e.g., Lancaster, 1990). For the ES sample we estimate the un-
37This drop had a signiﬁcant seasonal component as identiﬁed in our empirical ana-
lysis.










































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Open unemployment, ES participation, participation in exten-
ded ES and total participation in ALMPs by eligibles in PS and non-PS
municipalities July 1998–June2000. Means and ranges are matched for
comparability.
Source: Own computations using information from the H¨ andel data base
28 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?conditional (on the eligibility duration) Kaplan-Meier survival function to
employment from ES entrance. The estimator for the non ES sample uses
all unemployed at risk of entering ES or job (the same eligibility duration
as for the ES sample is created by matching on eligibility duration as for
the ES sample). An individual entering ES at a later time is censored at
that time. For the matching estimator we, in addition to the eligibility
duration, also match on the covariates given in Table 2 as well as on the
local labour market in which the individual is registered as job seeker. For
details on the matching estimators, see Fredriksson & Johansson (2004).
Figure 6 shows the estimated treatment eﬀects ( ∆(t)= S0(t)−  S1(t))
with 95 % conﬁdence intervals (c.i.). In both ﬁgures we show estimates
before and after matching on covariates. This means that the diﬀerences
between the upper and the lower panels in both ﬁgures reﬂect the eﬀects
of matching (i.e., the eﬀects of controlling for the observed individual
characteristics).
The estimates in ﬁgures 5 and 6 show that after an initial period of
about 6 months with a negligible (negative) treatment eﬀect there is an
upward jump; from then on the eﬀect gradually becomes smaller, but is
positive and signiﬁcant over the rest of the follow-up horizon (57 months).
This scenario is consistent with an initial period of locking in and a sub-
sequent period with a positive treatment eﬀect. The sum of the eﬀects
over the whole follow-up horizon is 7.78, which corresponds to a decrease
in unemployment duration (from the ES entrance) by almost 8 months.
Further, by comparing the upper and lower panels of ﬁgures 5 and
6, we infer that observed heterogeneity seems to matter: the “treatment
eﬀects” are reduced considerably by matching. It is also noteworthy that
the initial treatment eﬀects are negative (implying locking in) only after
matching.38 Hence, it seems that there is a positive selection into ES.
One advantage with the matching estimator is that we can compute
treatment eﬀects for diﬀerent durations in unemployment before entering
the programme. In Figure 7 we plot the treatment eﬀect for those entering
during months 0–3 after eligibility, and in Figure 8 we plot the treatment
eﬀect for those entering during months 36–39.
The general message conveyed by ﬁgures 7 and 8 is that treatment
eﬀects look rather similar irrespective of the timing of programme en-
38This ﬁnding may seem surprising given that the programme lasts for six months.
However, Lundin (2001) found that more than 30 % of the programme participants had
applied for at least one job while on the subsidised job.
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Figure 5: Survival functions to employment for participants and eligible
non-participants
trance.39 Once again, comparing the matched and unmatched estimates,
there seems to be a positive selection into ES for both early and late
entrants. The pattern is, however, more pronounced for the early entrants.
There is an important caveat concerning the interpretation of the res-
ults. In all ﬁgures we see that there is an upward jump in the estimated
treatment eﬀect after 6 months. A likely explanation for this is that
the participants simply tend to stay employed where they had their sub-
sidised employment. On the one hand, this is an intended eﬀect of the
programme. On the other hand, this result may be seen as an indication
that (consistent with previous evidence) the programme tends to displace
39This is true for the point estimates. The conﬁdence interval for those beginning
treatment during months 36–39 is, however, wide due to the small number (the number
of matched persons is 206; for 489 persons we found no match) of treated persons.














Figure 6: Estimated treatment eﬀect
regular employment.
The matching estimator identiﬁes a true treatment eﬀect under the
conditional independence assumption (CIA). We believe that we have rich
enough information to make the identifying assumption plausible. How-
ever, the assumption is non-testable, so we cannot be sure that the match-
ing results do not, at least to some degree, reﬂect selection rather than a
causal eﬀect.
Another concern is that the results would have a limited external valid-
ity because the sample for which we have a common support is small and
seems to be positively selected (see Section 4). To check the importance
of this, we have also estimated the treatment eﬀect using propensity score
matching. This gives us, roughly, twice as large a sample in the common
support. The results are virtually unchanged as compared to the results
derived by the exact covariate-matching procedure.














Figure 7: Estimated treatment eﬀect for participants entering during
months t =0 ,...,3
Hence, we now turn to the results derived by our IV estimators. If
the results are similar, this gives increased support to our interpretation
of the matching estimates.
5.2 The IV estimation
Details on the estimation methods are given in Appendix B. However, the
basic principle, as discussed in Section B, is to estimate separate models
for the hazard into programmes and into employment.














Figure 8: Estimated treatment eﬀect for participants entering during
months t =3 6 ,...,39
5.2.1 Non-parametric IV estimation
In Figure 9 we show the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of the eﬀect of
the tax reduction on the hazard to employment. The similarity to the
matching estimates of the treatment eﬀect is striking regarding the time
proﬁle: after a few initial months of locking in, the ﬂow into employment
goes up steadily until approximately three years. It then stays constant
for about a year, to ﬁnally end up at some 2 % at the end of the follow-up
horizon. To us, this resemblance to the matching estimates is reassuring:
although the parameters are not the same (especially since the individual
treatment eﬀects do not depend on entrance date, see ﬁgures 6–8), we see
no good reason why the time proﬁle should be diﬀerent.
For our approach to be valid, we ﬁrst rely on the tax reduction in







Figure 9: Estimated eﬀect of instrument on the hazard to employment
October 1999 to increase the inﬂow to ES in the placement-stop muni-
cipalities relative to the non-PS municipalities. In Figure 10 we plot the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of the eﬀect of the tax reduction on the
inﬂow into ES.
First, we see that the eﬀect indeed goes in the expected direction.
However, we also see that it is quite small (almost zero during the ﬁrst
year) and takes considerable time to build up. Furthermore, looking at
standard errors (not shown in the ﬁgure), we also see that the eﬀect is
estimated with low precision.
Given all caveats with precision of the estimates, we nevertheless ﬁnd
it worthwhile to show the IV estimates of the programme eﬀect. These
are displayed graphically in Figure 11.
Once again, the feature of the estimates we like to focus on is the time
pattern of the eﬀects. Although the estimated eﬀect is (unreasonably)








Figure 10: Estimated eﬀect of instrument on hazard into employment
subsidy programme
high, much higher than the corresponding matching estimates, the time
proﬁle bears close resemblance to the matching estimates.
5.2.2 Two stage least squares estimation
For the second IV estimator (the 2SLS estimator) we include all individu-
als who have a duration in unemployment that extends into May 1999,
thus PS(τ
p
i)=PSi. We also “assume” that the shortest time period to
measure the eﬀect of the ES is one month after entering treatment. Since
the eﬀects of the tax reduction take place for only 3 months (October-
December) we only use the ﬁrst three months after the placement stop
(May-July) and measure employment during three months (leaded with
one month) after either the PS and the TR, i.e., for June-August and










Figure 11: IV point estimates of the treatment eﬀect of employment sub-
sidies
November-January. The evaluation period is a maximum of three months
from the point in time when an individual has entered ES. In addition, we
extend this three months window to a maximum of a twelve months: June-
April and November-July. This implies a maximum of 12 months and a
minimum of 7 months past ES entrance. When the window is longer than
ﬁve months, we assume that the eﬀect is the result of the ﬁrst treatment
(i.e. the placement stop). Thus, the evaluation period is longer for the
pre tax-reduction sample. This procedure should be conservative, i.e., it
should bias the estimated eﬀect downwards.
The results from the 2SLS estimations are presented in Table 5.W ec a n
see that the tax reduction (statistically signiﬁcant) induces more people
into ES in the PS municipalities than in the non PS municipalities (the
point estimates of α1 in equation (5), displayed in the ﬁrst column of
36 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?Table 5, are positive for all lengths of the evaluation window). The eﬀect
on employment of this increase in placements into ES for the PS municip-
alities (the point estimates of δ in equation (6), given in the fourth column
of Table 5) is however never statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
This result stems from bad precision rather than from small point estim-
ates. The pattern of a direct locking in eﬀect (negative point estimates of
δ) and an thereafter positive eﬀect is, however, in accordance with both
the previously estimated time proﬁles.
Table 5: Parameter estimates (est.) and estimated standard errors
(s.e.) from the 2SLS estimator: ﬁrst and second step1
First step estimator IV estimator
Window est. s.e. est./s.e. est. s.e. est./s.e.
3 .010 .002 4.12 -2.662 2.534 -1.05
4 .008 .002 3.76 -4.140 2.865 -1.44
5 .007 .002 3.04 -6.418 3.627 -1.77
6 .007 .002 2.63 -4.848 3.152 -1.54
7 .005 .003 1.73 -3.704 3.967 -.93
8 .008 .003 2.50 -2.520 2.367 -1.06
9 .009 .003 2.61 .510 1.962 .26
10 .008 .003 2.45 .927 2.130 .44
11 .010 .003 3.16 .837 1.722 .49
12 .010 .003 3.52 .425 1.622 .26
1 In total 86 parameters are estimated: we control for the eligibility duration
to either tax reduction or to the placement stop date (a factor at 83 levels),
TR, BS and either Z (in the ﬁrst step) or D.
5.2.3 Cox regression models
Now we turn to the result from the separately estimated Cox regression
models. Here, as opposed to in the previous IV estimators, unobserved
heterogeneity matters for our estimated treatment eﬀect. It is well known
(see, e.g., Lancaster, 1990) that unobserved heterogeneity would bias our
estimates downwards. However, if the unobserved heterogeneity is the
same for the inﬂow into ES and into job, our eﬀect estimate would not be
biased. This is so since the eﬀect is estimated as ratios between two equally
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heterogeneity, we include several control variables in the Cox regressions:
we include monthly dummies, municipal dummies and all covariates given
in Table 1. The results from the regression are displayed in Table 6.
We, again, ﬁnd that the tax reduction increased the probability to join
ES more in the PS municipalities than in the non-PS municipalities (the
point estimate of α1 in equation (2)) is signiﬁcantly positive. The point
estimate of the eﬀect (1.42) implies that the odds to start an ES program
in a PS municipality increased by 4 times as compared to the non-PS
municipalities. The estimated eﬀect of our instrument (Z) on the ﬂow to
jobs (the (signiﬁcant) point estimate of β1 in equation (3)) implies that
the odds of ﬁnding a job in a PS municipality after the tax reduction
increased by 11 %.
The eﬀects on unemployment from increasing the number in ES by one
per cent ( ∆
PH
=  β1/ α1) then equals 0.11/1.42 = 0.07 with an estimated
standard error40 of 0.003. This is a quite large (and statistically signiﬁc-
ant) eﬀect, however not unreasonable. Remember that only about 3 %
of the long term unemployed participate in the ES program. Under the
assumption of a constant hazard, λ,w ec a l c u l a t e 41 the average monthly
job hazard for this long term unemployed to 4.17 %. By increasing the
number in ES with one per cent this would increase the hazard to 4.46 %
and the corresponding average duration would decrease by two months
(from 24 months to 22 months).
5.3 Summary of the results
For the matching estimator we estimate the eﬀects of ES from the ES
entrance date. For all IV estimators we estimate the treatment eﬀect for
those treated up to t.42 In addition, the results from the matching and IV
estimators are based on diﬀerent samples. We believe that the main results
from the matching estimators are corroborated by our IV analysis. This
strengthens our belief that we actually have suﬃcient information to match
on to successfully remove selection problems. The sample selections made
40The standard error is estimated by Gauss approximation.
41We assume a constant hazard, λ,t h e nλ =1 /m,w h e r em is the average duration.
m = 24, see Table 1.
42This is true also for the proportional hazard model. However, the treatment eﬀects
are assumed to be independent of the entrance date.
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statistics (est./s.e.) for the hazard regression models to ES and to job
Hazard to ES Hazard to job
Parameters est. est./s.e. est. est./s.e.
PS -0.34 -175.33 0.04 27.77
TR -2.14 -416.47 -0.18 -100.64
Z 1.42 268.56 0.11 74.55
February 0.08 25.38 -0.02 -8.07
March 0.18 58.74 -0.02 -6.93
April 0.09 31.30 0.06 22.84
May -0.04 -12.43 -0.10 -37.63
June 0.06 21.64 0.00 -1.06
July 0.11 37.29 0.03 10.35
August 0.11 38.03 0.02 7.01
September 0.12 39.02 0.05 18.20
October 0.06 21.99 -0.02 -7.81
November 0.10 32.19 -0.01 -3.29
December 0.20 67.39 -0.02 -8.77
Males 0.63 507.35 -0.02 -14.41
NonNordic 0.47 252.28 0.05 33.50
NoUI -0.31 -186.14 -0.43 -279.16
Disabled -0.57 -311.45 -0.81 -471.50
Gymnasium 0.28 192.14 0.65 507.51
University 0.28 148.13 0.78 475.95
AGE -0.16 -253.90 -0.26 -477.74
TD -0.27 -136.36 -0.01 -4.71
TP -0.93 -131.78 0.05 7.54
1 In the regression we additionally include a factor for muni-
cipality (69 levels) and 105 ﬁxed time eﬀects.
are discussed in Section 4. The general result is that both samples (the
matched sample and the sample used for the IV estimations) are positive
selections from the original sample of eligibles. Wether the positive results
of ES on employment also would be valid for the less advantaged groups
is an open question. Our guess is that, since the diﬀerence in background
for both selected samples is not large and the eﬀect is large, the results
IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane? 39found here are also externally valid.
6 Concluding comments
Our results suggest that there is a positive treatment eﬀect of participating
in the general employment subsidy programme. This is in line with results
in previous studies of Swedish ALMPs. It is also consistent with results
in programme evaluations in other OECD countries (Martin & Grubb
2001). On the other hand, our results are in contrast with the results for
most other Swedish programmes used during the last decade, where the
available evidence suggests that these programmes have had negative or
insigniﬁcant treatment eﬀects. This would seem to suggest that a heavier
emphasis on employment subsidies in the policy mix should be beneﬁcial.
However, there is also ample evidence, both Swedish and for other
countries, indicating that subsidised jobs in the private sector have larger
dead-weight and substitution eﬀects than other programmes (Calmfors
et al. 2001, Martin & Grubb 2001). Hence, there is a trade-oﬀ that should
be taken into consideration when designing labour market policies.
We apply methods suggested by Fredriksson & Johansson (2004) to
estimate treatment eﬀects when programme assignment is a random pro-
cess. This non-parametrical procedure gives us estimates of the time pro-
ﬁle of eﬀects as well as diﬀerential eﬀects for entry at diﬀerent points
in time. Although our approach is data demanding, it can deﬁnitely be
applied when evaluating other programmes. This is important, because
random programme start is a generic characteristic of most labour mar-
ket programmes. Finally, we show how to apply instrumental variables
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimators in a duration setting. Also this proced-
ure could be applied to evaluations of other programmes.
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A Persons leaving the PES register for unknown
reasons
A non-negligible number of persons leave the register of the PES for un-
known reasons. One possibility is that some of them, because they have
found a job, see no reason to contact the PES and, hence, leave the register
for unknown reasons.43 To ﬁnd out the extent to which those eligible for
employment subsidies who leave the PES register for unknown reasons
have found a job, we have matched the H¨ andel data base of the National
Labour Market Board with data from Statistics Sweden with monthly in-
formation on labour incomes.44 This procedure enables us to ascertain
whether there are systematic diﬀerences between those who have entered
the ES programme and the other eligibles with respect to the job-ﬁnding
rate among those who left the register for unknown reasons.
Accordingly, we measure labour income (through monthly employer
information to the tax authorities) the month after a person has left the
PES register for unknown reasons. To be considered employed in our
analysis, a person should have income during at least 32 days, and the
ﬁrst recorded income should occur no later than ten days after leaving the
register.
Around 4,500 participants in ES left the PES register for unknown
reasons during the period 1998–2000. In Table A1 we show the fractions
of eligibles leaving the PES register with incomes in diﬀerent intervals
according to our deﬁnition above.
We see that a majority of those who left the register had a monthly
income at least amounting to SEK 5,000. It is not evident which income
limit should be used to deﬁne “employment”; it is, however, clear that
with a reasonable cut-oﬀ, the fraction employed is relatively large. This
is in accordance with the results in Bring & Carling (2000) and Sahin
(2003).45
Further, we see that the share in employment is larger for the ES
43That this is actually the case is indicated by Bring & Carling (2000) and Sahin
(2003).
44Our available information covers the period 1998–2000.
45Their results apply to register leavers in general, whereas our results apply to those
eligible for ES, i.e., persons with a long duration in the register.
44 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?Table A1: Labour incomes among eligibles who left the PES register for
unknown reasons
Monthly labour income Participants Non-participants
≥ 2275 67 55
≥ 5000 62 50
≥ 10000 47 38
≥ 12500 34 28
≥ 15000 19 17
participants, irrespective of the cut-oﬀ chosen. This indicates that we, by
disregarding this exit to work in our empirical analysis in this paper, if
anything underestimate the treatment eﬀect of ES.
B IV estimation: Estimand and estimator
B1 The ﬁrst IV estimator
Let T be the duration to employment and let {Y (τ)}
t
τ=0 be the sequence
of monthly employment indicators. Furthermore let T(0) be the duration
in unemployment if not in ES and let s be the time when entering ES.
If an individual is employed at duration T = t, Y (t)=1 . Treatment
assignment can in this framework be denoted D(t)=I(T(0) >T= t).
The meaning of this is simply that the duration in unemployment if not
treated is interrupted by entering ES. In the same fashion, denote Z(t)=
I(T>t |T ∈ October 1999). Thus Z(t) = 1 if an unemployment spell
giving rise to ES eligibility extends into October 1999, i.e., when the tax
reduction came into eﬀect. The survival function before and after TR can,
given this notation, be written
S(t|Z(t)) = Pr(T>t |Z(t)) = Pr(Y (t)=0 |Z(t),{Y (τ)=0 }
t−1
τ=0).
This survival function may be decomposed according to
S(t|Z(t)) = Pr(Y (t)=0 |D(t)=1 ,Z(t),{0})Pr(D(t)=1 |Z(t),{0})
+P r ( Y (t)=0 |D(t)=0 ,Z(t),{0})Pr(D(t)=0 |Z(t),{0}),
IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane? 45where, to make the presentation more compact, {Y (τ)=0 }
t−1
τ=0 = {0}. If
Z(t) is a valid instrument, Pr(Y (t)=0 |D(t)=j,Z(t),{0})=P r ( Y (t)=
0|D(t)=j,{.})=Sj(t); j =0 ,1; and, hence,
S(t|Z(t)) = S1(t)Pr(D(t)=1 |Z(t),{.})+S0(t)Pr(D(t)=0 |Z(t),{.})
=[ S0(t) − S1(t)]Pr(D(t)=0 |Z(t),{.})+S1(t)
=[ S0(t) − S1(t)]F(t|Z(t)) + S1(t).
S1(t) is the survival function in unemployment for the up to t randomly
(from the ﬂow of eligibles) assigned ES participants, while S0(t) is the
counterfactual survival function if not in ES, i.e., ∆(t)=S0(t) − S1(t)
measures the eﬀect of treatment for the up to duration t randomly assigned
individuals. F(t|Z(t)) = Pr(D(t)=0 |Z(t),{0}) is the survival function
to ES. If we take the diﬀerence between before and after TR we get
S(t|Z(t)=0 ) −S(t|Z(t)=1 )=[ S0(t)−S1(t)]

F(t|Z(t)=0 )− F(t|Z(t)=1 )

Hence, the causal eﬀect of participation in ES before t can be estimated
as
∆D(t)=[ S(t|Z(t)=0 )− S(t|Z(t) = 1)]/(F(t|Z(t)=0 )− F(t|Z(t) = 1)).
(B1)
The diﬀerence estimator in (B1) cannot, however, identify a causal
parameter since Z(t) is not ignorable in the survival function to employ-
ment when conditioning on treatment. First, at the same time as the TR
was introduced, a number of other events took place. Most importantly,
the extended employment subsidy was introduced (and rapidly reached
larger volumes than the ES we study). In addition, business cycle changes,
which aﬀected the chances to ﬁnd a job, may have occurred. Hence, a
simple before-after comparison may be misleading. Second, to the ex-
tent that there is an eﬀect of participation on the hazard to employment,
participants and non-participants will become right-censored to diﬀerent
extents. Also for this reason the estimator (B1) will not identify a causal
parameter. Both of these complications can be taken care of by instead
using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator, where we compare the municip-
alities aﬀected and non-aﬀected by the placement stop (PS), but located
in the same local labour markets.
Hence, let W = 0 denote a non-PS municipality and W =1aP S
municipality. Further, denote the survival function for w = j, and Z(t)=
46 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?k by S(t|Z(t)=k,W = j)=S(t|k,j) and use the same notation for
the survival function to ES. Then we can write a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimator as
∆DD(t)=
S(t|0,1) − S(t|1,1) − (S(t|0,0) − S(t|1,0))




B1.0.1 Estimation Let ˆ F(t|0,1) and ˆ F(t|1,1) be the ex post and
ex ante Kaplan-Meier survival estimates into ES for PS municipalities;
ˆ S(t|0,1) and ˆ S(t|1,1) the corresponding estimates to employment. Fur-
ther, let ˆ F(t|1,0), ˆ F(t|0,0) and ˆ S(t|0,0) and ˆ S(t|1,0) be the corresponding
estimates for the non-PS municipalities. To estimate the ex post survival
functions we use all individuals who are at risk (to ES and job) before
October 1999. The ex ante estimates are based on the individuals at risk
(ES and job) in October, November and December 1999.
To determine the eﬀect we estimate separate models for the hazards
to ES and employment. Needless to say, for our approach to be valid, the
PS municipalities should put eligibles into ES to a higher extent than the
non-ES municipalities when the mode of ﬁnance changed in October 1999.
B2 The third IV estimator: proportional hazard regression
Let λJ(t,TR,PS) be the probability (hazard rate) to be employed after
t months of unemployment and let λES(t,TR,PS) be the probability to
enter ES after t months of unemployment. These probabilities are func-
tions of the tax reduction and the placement stop. Thus λJ(t,0,1) denotes
the probability to be employed for an eligible individual in a PS municip-
ality before the tax reduction was introduced.




Assuming time constant “eﬀects” we have β2 =( l nλJ(t,1,1)−lnλJ(t,0,1)),
β3 =( l nλJ(t,0,1)−lnλJ(t,0,0)) and β1 =( l nλJ(t,1,1)−lnλJ(t,0,1)−
(lnλJ(t,1,0) − lnλJ(t,0,0))). Under this assumption, equation (B3) can
be simpliﬁed as
λJ(t)=g0(t)exp(β1Z(t)+β2TR(t)+β3PS(t)) (B4)
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t months in unemployment and Z(t)=TR(t)PS(t), thus Z(t)=I(T>
t|T ∈ October 1999) if living in a PS municipality. Here PS(t)i sas t e p
function for an unemployed in a PS municipality (i.e., PS(t) = 1 after
the placement stop occurred) and TR(t) is also a step function for all
unemployed from October 1999.
The probability to enter the ES program can, similarly, be be written
as
λES(t)=h0(t)exp(α1Z(t)+α2TR(t)+α3PS(t)). (B5)
Notice that both PS(t)a n dTR(t) diﬀer from the speciﬁcations for the
employment hazard. In the hazard to ES, they are both impulse functions
(instead of step functions): PS(t) = 1 only for a duration spell in May–
December 1999 and TR(t) = 1 only for spells in October–December 1999.
This reﬂects the assumption that the instrument aﬀected the assignment
to ES only during the placement stop period, whereas the eﬀects on the
hazard to employment may occur later.






B2.0.1 Estimation We use maximum likelihood and estimate the
model in discrete time (Kalbﬂeich & Prentice 1980, Ch. 4). The prob-
abilities to enter employment and enter ES after (t + 11) months in un-
employment for individual i are speciﬁed as
λJ
i (t)=1− exp(−e(β0+βt+β1Zi(t)+β2TRi(t)+β3PSi(t)+Xi(t) β)),
and
λES
i (t)=1− exp(−e(α0+αt+α1(t)Zi(t)+α2SRi(t)+α3PSi(t)+Xi(t) α)),
respectively. Here Xi(t) is a vector of control variables and αt and βt are
estimates of g0(t)a n dh0(t), respectively.
48 IFAU—Employment subsidies, a fast lane?C The municipalities used in the IV estimations
The 69 municipalities in the 7 local labour markets used in the IV estima-
tions are displayed on the map in Figure C1. The bulk of the observations
derive from the local labour market around Stockholm, but there is some
geographic dispersion and all municipalities are not located in the vicinity
of the three largest cities (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malm¨ o). However,
no local labour markets from northern Sweden are used.
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Figure C1: The municipalities used in the IV estimations. The grey areas
are PS municipalities and the black areas are non-PS municipalities in the
same local labour markets
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